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In June of 1980, the President of the United States signed into law
the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, a piece of national legislation
that will most definitely have international repercussions. The develop-
ing nations of the world are strongly opposed to unilateralism on the part
of any nation, contending the minerals of the deep seabed belong to all
nations and, therefore, the benefit from the exploitation of those minerals
should likewise be shared by all nations. ~fuy then, against such firm
opposition from the less developed countries of the world, did the United
States opt for unilateralism instead of waiting for an international agree-
ment to regulate the resources of the deep seabed? This paper proposes to
examine whether unilateral exploitation by the United States of the deep
seabed beyond the limits of its national jurisdiction is authorized by
existing international law, and secondly, is such legislation actually
necessary? Are the vital interests of the United Stntes served by such
legislation or will the international reaction be detrimental to U.S.
interests abroad?
To more clearly understand the situation it is necessary to realize
that the law of the sea is not a new problem. Maritime disagreements have
been taking place since the days of the Roman Empire. ~fuat has taken place
recently is the attempt to codify the law of the sea to reduce the likeli-
hood of disputes or, at the very least, the threat of conflict from these
1
disputes. If we look to the late 1950's to the present we will see
numerous international endeavors to bring about this codification.
The deep seabed and the mining of the minerals on the ocean floor, has
proven to be the most controversial issue at these law of the sea negotia-
tions. The area in dispute covers over fifty per cent of the earth's sur-
face and figures to be an important source of minerals in the future. This,
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coupled with ideological differences, has polarized the world such that for
the most part the battle is two-sided; the developed nations versus the
developing nations.
Historically, the initial knowledge surrounding the deep seabed and
the presents of the manganese nodules was obtained following the voyage of
the HMS CHALLENGER, under the leadership of Sir Wyville Thomson, over one
hundred years ago (1872-1876). The nodules retrieved on this voyage were
never analyzed for mineral content for nearly seventy years thereafter.
Following World War II interest in the deep seabed and the minerals con-
tained therein began to expand.
In 1958 the First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,
UNCLOS I, convened. After centuries of disputing the international com-
munity assembled to attempt to codify the laws of the sea. This assemblage
of international representatives was able to produce four conventions deal-
ing with the high seas,2fishing and the conservation of living resources,3
the continental shelf. 4 and the territorial sea and the contiguous zone. 5
In 1960 the Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,
UNCLOS II, met in an attempt resolve the issue of the territorial sea which
had not been settled at UNCLOS I. The Second Conference proved equally
incapable of resolving the question.
In 1965 Ambassador Arvid Pardo of Malta proclaimed the "common her.itage
of mankind" principle before the U.N. General Assembly.
In 1969 the U.N. General Assembly passed the Moratorium Resolution6
which called for persons and states to refrain from exploiting the resources
of the deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction.
In 1970 the U.N. General Assembly unanimously passed the Declaration
of Principles Governing the Seabed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil
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Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction7 which declared the
deep seabed to be the "common heritage of mankind" to be exploited for the
benefit of mankind as a whole.
In 1972 the United Nations General Assembly called for a Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea(UNCLOS III).
In 1974 UNCLOS III is formally convened in Caracas. Venezuela. and
is still in progress after nine complete sessions.
In 1980 the United States enacted the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral
8Resources Act. This was the first unilateral attempt by a government to
permit mining of the deep seabed beyond its own national jurisdiction.
One can easily see that nearly a decade passed between the United
Nations General Assembly Resolutions of 1969 and 1970 and the U.S.
unilateral legislation of 1980. This. along with the fact that nine ses-
sions have been held to date and no agreement has been reached attests to
the difficulty of negotiating an international agreement dealing with the
exploration and exploitation of the deep seabed. After waiting a decade in
hopes of reaching a favorable agreement the U.S. apparently felt the time
was right to enact national legislation to permit the deep ocean mining.
This action was taken with several purposes in mind. namely, to encourage
the successful conclusion of a comprehensive Law of the Sea Treaty;9 pend-
ing the entry into force of such a treaty. to provide for the establishment
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of an international revenue-sharing fund; to establish an interim program
to regulate the exploration for and the commercial recovery of hard mineral
11
resources of the deep ~e abed by U.S. citizens; to accelerate .
environmental assessment of such exploration and ensure that such explora-
tion and recovery activities are conducted in such a manner as to encourage
the conservation of such resources, protect the quality of the environment~
4
12
and promote the safety of life and property at sea; and finally, to
encourage the continued development of technology necessary to recover the
13
hard mineral resources of the deep seabed.
With this background in mind, let us proceed to the legal side of the
controversy. Was the U.S. enactment of unilateral deep sea mining legis la-
tion contrary to existing international law? It has been contended by some
that unilateral exploitation of the ocean areas beyond national jurisdic-
tion is not in keeping with existing laws and principles, with the concept
of "common heritage of mankind ll , nor is it consistent with the concensus
14
at the United Nations Conferences on the Law of the s.ea , Yet others
would argue that the U.S. was well within their legal rights to enact this
15
type legislation under the principle of "freedom of the seas. If we
look then at the concept of "freedom of the Seas" as it existed prior to
16
UNCLOS I, we find it to be a historical compromise between res nullius
d . i' 17 h h' h . d h han res comrnun1S om n1um, t at w 1C 1S owned by no one an t at w ich is
common to all.
Roman law concepts can be used in presenting a case for U.S. exploita-
tion. Generally, title to any res nullius can be obtained by satisfying
18
the requirement of occupation. Occupation has two requirements: first,
that the claimed thing actually possess res nullius status(i.e. it has no
owner, has been abandoned by the former owner, or it has never been owned
by anyone), and second, that lI e f f e c t i ve control" be established by the
19
capture of the ~ nullius object. Such objects that have been included
in the category of res nullius include fish,20 pearls,21 free-floating
d f k d h · 22 d d 1 h 1 23 Whgoo s rom wrec e S 1pS, an manganese no u es t emse ves. ereas
the surface at the sea and the air were deemed res communis omnium due to
the impossibility of satisfying the "effective control" requirement.
5
When it comes to the actual exploration and exploitation of the deep
seabed a different principle emerges, that of freedom of the seas. This
concept was set forth by Hugo Grotius in a 17th century work in which he
states, "Therefore, the sea is one of those things which is not an
article of merchandise, and which cannot become private property. Hence,
it follows, to speak strictly, that no part of the sea can be considered
24
as the territory of any people whatsoever." Taken at face value it would
appear that the freedom of the sea principle would not coincide with the
unilateral mining attempt of the U.S. But, I feel just the opposite is
true. The proponents of deep seabed miniqg and the legislators of the U.S.
do not intend to claim sovereign jurisdiction over any area of the seabed.
The Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act states that the U.S. "does not
thereby exert sovereignty or ·s ove r e i gn or exclusive rights or jurisdiction
over, or the ownership of, any areas or resources in the deep seabed." 2S
The freedom of the sea principle prohibits ~overeign claims to the seabed,
but does not forbid the unilateral exploration and exploitation of the
manganese nodules. The nodules then would be considered res nullius not
owned by anyone but subject to harvesting by anyone with the technology
to accomplish the task.
It should be kept in mind that prior to the 1958 United Nations
Conference. this freedom of the sea principle, after three and a half
centuries, had developed into customary international law that also pre-
scribed to the norm that insists on "reasonable regard to the interests of
26
other states in theLr exercise of the freedom of the seas. This must
be mentioned so as not to give the impression that this freedom is absolute.
The oceans have 'served man in many ways, as a source of food, as a trans-
portation medium, and a potential source of energy. Any o f these opera-
6
tions may conflict with another at any time. ~len this does happen there
must be a balance between maintaining the best possible use of the oceans
27
along with the right of other states to exercise their freedoms.
Therefore, I conclude that the unilateral legislation passed by the
United States is in keeping with the customary international principle set
forth by Grotius in the 17th century, and that the manganese nodules are
~ nullius, and may be exploited by anyone. The sea and the seabed must
be classified as res communis and not subject to exclusive control by any
person or state. Just as fishing, the laying of submarine cables, or even
naval exercises can be controlled so as not to interfere with the rights of
others to use the seas, so too can the harvesting of manganese nodules be
controlled.
In 1958 the First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea met
in an attempt to codify this customary law. There were four conventions
produced at the Conference, but only one, the Convention on the High Seas,
is directly related to the issue of deep seabed mining. Of the thirty-
seven article~ of the convention, Articles 1 and 2 are particularly
relevant to this discussion. For this reason I will quote both articles
in their entirety:
Article 1: The term "high seas" means all parts
of the sea that are not included in the terri-
torial sea or in the internal waters of a State.
Article 2: The high seas being open to all nations,
no nation may validly purport to subject any part
of them to its sovereignty . Freedom of the high
seas is exercised under the conditions laid down
7
by these articles and by the other rules of inter-
national law. It comprises, inter al ia, both for
coastal and non-coastal States:
(1) Freedom of navigation;
(2) Freedom of fishing;
(3) Freedom to lay submarine cables
and pipelines;
(4) Freedom to fly over the high seas.
These freedoms, and others that are recognized by
general principles of international law, shall be
exercised by all States with reasonable regard to
the interests of other States in their exercise
of the freedom of the high seas. 28
Nowhere in either article, or in the entire convention, is there a
prohibition on exploration and exploitation of the deep seabed. The four
freedoms listed in Article 2 are definitive, but are by no means exclusive.
The drafters of the convention illsutrated this fact by including the
"inter alia" clause prior to the enumeration of the freedoms as evidence
of the non-exclusivity of the list.
It has also been contended by some opponents of unilateralism that the
seabed is not entitled to the freedom of the sea protection as stated in
Article 2. However, the article does state that the high seas refers to
"all parts of the sea ••• " thus, I believe including the seabed areas with-
in that category.
Therefore, I must conclude that the Convention on the High Seas did
not limit or restrict any nation from undertaking unilateral m:i.ning of the
deep seabed. Although not specifically mentioned in Article 2, the "free-
8
dam to mine the dee~ seabed can he supported by the 'inter alia' clause
and I would further conclude that the seabed is part of the high seas as
intencled "by the drafters of the Convention by stating the high seas in-
eludes "all parts of the sea ••• 'I
The next matter to be discussed is that of the 1969 and 1970 United
Nations General Assembly Resolution revelant to deep seabed mining. Both
resolutions should be analyzed as to their status as international law and
whether they have, over the past decade, replaced or in any way modified
customary international law. Examining both resolutions as to their initial
legal status, it must be remembered that both are General Assembly resolu-
tions, and as such are not legally binding on any nation. The U.N. Charter
is specific as far as the powers of the General Assembly are concerned.
Chapter 4 of the Charter grants the Assembly the power to hold deliberations
on matters of international importance and render a recommendation on the
matter, but the Assembly does not have any legislative authority.29
Secondly, has either resolution created or modified accepted customary
international law? To determine this, each resolution will be examined in
light of the elements required to bring about a change in international
law. First, is there evidence of a "habitual act" among nations. second,
do states perceive a legal obligation not a "comity"; third, is the new
practice accepted by a majority of affected states; and finally, is the new
30
resolution practiced over a reasonable length of time.
The Moratorium Resolution
In 1969 the General Assembly passed this resolution by a vote of sixty-
two in favor, twenty-eight against, and twenty-eight abstaining, and eight
not voting. The resolution attempted to prohibit a single nation or small
group of nations from exploiting the minerals of the deep s eabed . Examin-
9
ing the resolution based on the four criteria above, it must be recognized
that the first, the habitual act or usage requirement is mainly theoretical
since most states must refrain from the practice because they lack the
technology. As for the "legal obligation", the U.S. has stated from the
outset and repeatedly over the last decade, that the resolution has no
binding legal effect on this country. The majority of affected states did
not favor the resolution either. Although only twenty-eight states out of
a possible one hundred and twenty-six were not in favor of the resolution,
those states included the large industrialized nations most affected by the
resolution. The United States, Soviet Union, Great Britian, France, the
Netherlands, and Canada were some of the nations not favoring passage of
the resolution. Has the Moratorium Resolution weathered the international
test of time? Although this factor may vary from case to case, a period of
less than ten years, for a practice that was accepted by less that fifty
per cent of the then voting members of the United Nations, does not seem
to meet the criteria, thereby altering existing norms.
The Declaration of Principles
One year after the Moratorium Resolution, the General Assembly passed
the Declaration of Principles Governing the Seabed and the Ocean Floor, and
the Subsoil Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, commonly
referred to as the Declaration of Principles. The resolution stated that
the deep seabed was part of the "common heritage of mankind" and as such
was not to be exploited except for the benefit of mankind as a whole and
then only with international concensus and under an international regime.
The resolution passed the General Assembly by a vote of one hundred and
eight in favor, none opposed, and eight abstaining . Because of the over-
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whelming support for the resolution the requirement of "habitual act or
usage" seems to be at least outwardly satisfied. But the indication th~t
the same overwhelming majority of states recognized the resolution as
legally binding is absent. Several industrialized nations, the U.S. among
them, supported the Declaration in principle, but made it known that the
resolution was in no way legally binding on them. The acceptance criteria
may be met politically but not legally. The final criteria, that of time,
has also not been met because the resolution is drafted in futuristic terms
based on the formation of some kind of international seabed mining regime.
Taken literally then, the resolution cannot be violated or practiced until
that regime has been formally recognized and established by the proposed
Law of the Sea Treaty.
It would seem that neither resolution has achieved the status of
international law, nor has either resolution altered existing laws.
It might be well to move to the next point of controversy, that of
the "common heritage of mankind". The dispute persists because what this
concept means to the United States as applied to deep seabed mining is
completely different from the views held by the developing nations of the
world. The concept was first presented by Ambassador Pardo in 1967 and to
some it has taken on the status of customary international law.
Common Heritage of Mankind
(U.S. view)
The United States' view of the principle of "common heritage of man-
kind" is quite different from that held by the Group of 77. As a major
industrialized nation and one that imports a large amount of minerals, the
common heritage prd.nc fpLe is one of first come, first served. This may
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be somewhat simplistic but basically correct. The U.S. holds that the
principle binds a nation 1n no way to halt development of deep sea mining
techniques and preparations for future mining operations. The minerals
of the deep seabed, just like fish, are available to anyone who can har-
vest t.he resource and profit from it. This llcommon heritage" principle,
although first brought forth in the 19601s, has not yet been clearly de-
fined and still today has varied interpretations. The United States con-
tends that the "freedom of the sea" clause grants the right to mine the
nodules and is more universally accepted as international law.
Common Heritage of Mankind
(Third World view)
The Third World, composed of some of the lesser developed countries
of the world, subscribe to the policy followed by the Group of 77. These
nations contend that the "common heritage of mankind" means the resources
of the deep seabed are the common property of mankind, to be exploited
only by an international regime,. and the benefits distributed accordingly.
This concept has achieved the status of customary international law based
on the fact it was overwhelmingly ~ccepted by the world community of the
United Nations. This principle has been a unification factor for the
Third World at the Law of the Sea Conference and one which they seem very
reluctant to compromise.
Since the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea was formally con-
vened in 1974, nine sessions have taken place with the tenth session under-
way at this time. The task facing these representatives was monumental
to say the least; the formulation of a comprehensive international con-
vention on the d~velopment of the oceans that would be acceptable world-
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wide. One of the few remaining controversies to be settled is that of the
deep ocean resources and how they should be exploited. There have been
various methods proposed from unilateralism to strict international reg-
ulation to some sort of mutual compromise. TI1e unilateral approach of
course would permit persons or states to mine the deep seabed beyond nation-
al jurisdication, supplying their own capital and own technology to harvest
the resources and benefits that are contained therein. The strict inter-
national regulatory approach would call for the cessation of all unilateral
exploration and exploitation of the deep seabed until an international
regime can be formed. Once put into action this international mining com-
pany would control all aspects of the mining operation. This would require
the developed nations to transfer technology to this mining enterprise so
as to accomplish that complete control. The benefits from the exploitation
would be distributed accordingly, paying particular at tent ion to the lesser
developed nations. There was a compromise of sorts between the two in that
a parallel system of exploration and exploitation would be set up. Under
this system a person, state, or consortium would explore two mining sites
and one would be given to the international regime to exploit. Although
great strides have been made, controversies centering around transfer of
technology, primary investment protection, and assured access to the sites
by the U.S. have prevented a deep seabed agreement from being realized.
Although these different points of view have been simply stated, they
nonetheless have accounted for a large part of the debate at the Conference.
Each faction unwilling, or unable, to recognize the position of the other.
It is partly because these factions have been unable to reach some sort
of equitable agreement during the various sessions, and the possibility
that further negotiations might prove fruitless, that the United States
13
went forward with the unilateral legislation. The unilateral approach
seemed to be the best route for the U.S. to pursue. The strategic,
economic, and political considerations seemed to outweigh the international
disadvantages of the proposed agreement.
Strategic Importance of Unilateral Deep Seabed Mining
With international negotiations on the seabed well into its second
decade and this country's increasing reliance on imports for "strategic
minerals", many people believe it is now imparative that the U.S. enact
unilateral legislation to counter this trend and harvest the minerals of
the deep sea area beyond our national jurisdiction. The nodules located
in the area are known to contain manganese, copper, cobalt, and nickel, all
"critical" minerals as far as the U.S. is concerned. Manganese is
essential in the manufacture of steel. But, by the year 2000, according
to some analyses, acceptable land-based manganese ores from non-Soviet bloc
sources will be available principally from South Africa and Gabon -
31
countries about which there must be considerable political uncertainty.
Further, these analyses suggest that non-Soviet bloc countries may begin
to experience a manganese deficit as early as 1987. 3 2
Likewise, nickel is used in the manufacturing of stainless steel,
cobalt for high-performance magnets and electro-magnetic devices and
various high technology communication systems, while copper is used quite
extensively throughout electrical systems.
There are no significant reserves of cobalt, manganese, or nickel in
the United States. However, we are a major copper producer, but our
reliance on foreign sources is substantial and our domestic ores are de-
clining in grade. Thus, we are left with the choice of foreign imports or
14
the deep seabed.
The statistics set out below point out the reliance on foreign im-
ports by the United States:
Metal 1976
(in per cent)33
1977 1978
Cobalt
Copper
Manganese
Nickel
98
12
98
70
97
13
98 ·
70
97
19
98
77
Other strategically and politically revelant issues centered around
international licensing and limits on mineral recovery, transfer of tech-
nology, investment protection, and access to the mining areas. In deciding
on the unilateral approach, the United States "guaranteed ll any U.S.
citizen or f or e i gn consortia the assured access to the minerals based on
reciprocating agreements and freedom of the seas. The "wholesale ll trans-
fer of technology that was to occur under an international regime, can more
closely be controlled, thereby ensuring U.S. technological superiority
in this field. With the national legislation comes a legal framework
through which exploration and subsequent exploitation can be achieved.
Investors will be more apt to invest large amounts of capital required
~10wing the venture is now sanctioned by U.S. domestic law.
It is stressed that the unilateral legislation, although interim in
design, must meet both the short and long-term requirements of the United
States. In the near future, 1982, the Commerce Department may grant U.S.
miners licenses to begin site exploration and by 1 January 1988 site
. 34
exploitation may beg1n . But what of the potential long-term effects
of the unilateral legislation? What are the potential consequences of a
breakdown in the law of the sea negotiations or non-agreement on the use
15
of the deep seabed beyond a nation's jurisdiction?
The possibility of a complete breakdown of the conference without
producing some kind of agreement is s11m. The time and effort put forth
to this point, plus the idea of permitting the law to develop through
customary procedures, makes the continuation of the negotiations the better
of the two choices.
If, because of unilateralism, the conference fails to reach an agree-
ment on the law of the sea, what actions might be taken by nations to
further their economic interests? Some possible actions might include bi-
lateral agreements, limited multilateral agreements, foreign domestic
35legislation, and the threat or use of force. In any case there might
be an alteration in the oceanic scheme as we know it today. It could be
expected that developed nations, at least the technologically capable
ones, would commence deep ocean mining operations. These operations would
probably be sanctioned by domestic law or some reciprocating agreement.
Other changes could possibily be foreseen; the extension of coastal states'
territorial sea anywhe r e from twelve to two hundred nautical miles. And
if that coastal state happens to have a large continental shelf, claims
beyond two hundred miles might become commonplace.
Passage through the various international straits could come into
dispute. Control of passage or the outright denial of passage through a
strait might also be anticipated. However, one study indicates that the
cost of denial of access to straits for merchant shipping would not be
37great and denial to military vessels would be contingent on a nation's
ability and will to restrict another countries naval movements. Alterna-
t ive routing would produce a higher cost in shipping the goods, but the
increase would not be drastic by any means. The same would apply if the
16
two hundred nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone were closed to merchant
fleets of certain nations.
It could also be expected that fisheries, navigation, oceanic re-
search and environmental protection would also be affected. For example,
the establishment of exclusive fisheries for use by only the coastal state;
navigation would be hindered by the extension of territorial seas and
contiguous zones and control of vessels through straits; the uncertainty
of the states of ocean research off the coast of various states; and last
but not least, the environment might suffer since the regulation and con-
trol of pollution will be left to the coastal state instead of adherence
to uniform international standards.
These are again only possibilities, potential reactions if unilater-
alism causes UNCLOS III not to reach some sort of internationally equitable
agreement. If an agreement can be reached all these actions would be
negated, but time may be running short. The United States has weighed
these factors and passed the domestic legislation, signalling to the
developing nations our intent to seek an equitable treaty for the developed
nations and the lesser developed countries, but failing to achieve this
goal, to continue in the deep ocean endeavor despite the potential economic
and political threats from the Group of 77.
Economic Importance of Deep Seabed Mining
The manganese nodules take on economic significance because of their
h~gh mineral content, 30% manganese, 1.4% nickel, 1.2% copper, and 0.25%
cobalt. As mentioned earlier, these are all essential minerals for the
U.S. and all of which, except copper, are largely imported by the U.S.
To overcome this mining consortia and investors have looked to the deep
17
seabed as a new source of mineral supply. Some contend the retrieval of
the nodules is not feasible. while others would have you believe ocean
mining will drastically change the cost of metals in the future. Studies
done by Kennecott Copper Corporation have shown that the cost of recovering
the mat~rials from the deep seabed can be competitive with land-based
38
sources of the metals but will not displace the present supply sources.
It has been estimated that deep seabed mining will generate meaning-
ful economic activity. One mining project is estimated to be about a
$1.25 billion investment alone with a continued investment of about $200
39
million per year per project. To attract this type of capital there
must be some reasonably stable framework through which development can
take place.
When will ocean mining begin and how profitable will it be? Best
estimates are that ocean mining cannot begin before 1985 and probably
will be even later than that. Since no one has built and operated an
ocean mining plant, our present estimates of economic potential must be
based on data collected, models built and tested, and the engineering
evaluations of the various consortia. It can be reasonably concluded that
since a significant number of ~lajor corporations have found their estimates
of the competitiveness of mining manganese nodules sufficiently attractive
to warrant the expenditure of large amounts of research and development
money the venture must be worth pursuing. Some industry statements have
indicated the nickel contained in just two deep sea deposits could almost
equal the total size of the world's land-based reserves of this metal. 40
The potential for deep seabed mining was also expressed by Marne A. Dubbs,
Director of Ocean Resources for Kennecott Copper Corporation, "Technological
progress on ocean mining has been excellent - we are ready to go. Economic
18
f . . b 1 ht ,,41prospects or ocean m1nlng are r g •
Political Importance of Deep Seabed Mining
In addition to the potential strategic and economic results of U.S.
domestic deep seabed mining legislation, the political repercussions must
also be examined. I believe there is little doubt the legislation caused
anger and disbelief in many developing countries. The reaction was, in
many ways, predictable. The President, Congress, and our UNCLOS negotia-
ting team were aware of the various statement emanating from the developing
countries concerning U.S. domestic ocean law. What was required was a
careful and deliberate weighing of the advantages versus the disadvantages
of such legislation. There are those who would contend that unilateralism
was the only route to take, while others continually support the inter-
national position.
This portion of the paper will analyze the oajor benefits and the
drawbacks of the U.S. ocean law. Let us look initially at the advantages
of unilateral legislation from a U.S. perspective.
Transfer of Technologx
The first advantage of unilateral legislation is that the United
States nationals will not be obliged to transfer any mining technology to
the international Enterprise. Although the international treaty would have
to specify what technology would have to be transferred, it would probably
involve only that technology presently used in the operation and to which
the miners have legal right of transfer. However, the U.S. has opposed
any form of mandatory technology transfer. Mandatory transfer requirements
would carry no assurance of protection of highly proprietary information,
42
or of compensation in the event that information is compromised.
19
Defense-sensitive technologies would be subject to mandatory transfer, in
direct conflict with export control constraints under ex~sting federal
43law.
Assured Access
There is a need to ensure U.S. access, on reasonable and equitable
terms, to the minerals of the deep seabed. The minerals contained in the
manganese nodules are considered " critical minerals" to the United States.
Land-based mineral resources appear to be adequate until the end of the
century, and the possibilities of cartelization are r emot e . However, the
assured access to these deep sea minerals sought by the U.S. looks as
though it will not take place. The unilateral legislation could provide
for such access, and it may also improve the chances of the U.S.
negotiating a satisfactory access clause within the framework of an inter-
national treat~.
Legal Framework
Because deep seabed mining is considered a "pioneering" venture,
large sums of money must be invested in research and development, and the
technological uncertainties and the market risks are high. So in order
to attract the required large capital, a stable legal framework must exist.
If companies are to invest millions of dollars in this area they must be
rea~onably assured a future treaty will not negate years of exploration
and exploitation under domestic law. In the absence of an international
treaty to provide thiS, domestic law may suffice. The investors would
have some legal framework from which to launch their ocean venture.
Environmental Protection
Without an international treaty nations could commence mining the
20
the deep seabed without being subject to environmental regulations. But
unilateral legislation could, and the U.S. legislation does. specify cer-
tain environmental considerations that must be adhered to before, during,
and 'upon terminating mining operations.
Deep Seabed Revenue Sharing Trust Fund
Taxes i ev i e d on the recovery of minerals will be used to establish a
revenue sharing trust fund. Upon beginning commercial recovery of the
nodules, the mining companies pay a certain amount of money based On the
amount of minerals recovered. The fund is for the developing countries
and will be administered in accordance with the provisions of the act.
Freedom of the Seas
There is a realistic need to develop the seabed resources in a manner
that is consistent with U.S. interests in the preservation of certain
traditional high seas freedoms. The Deep Seabed Hard ~[ineral Resources
Act states that the United States "does not assert sovereignty or
sovereign or exclusive rights over, or the ownership of, any area of the
deep seabed." The existing law, as the U.S. sees it, is that any country
has the right to mine the resourceS of the deep seabed, provided it pays
reasonable regard to the interests and freedoms of other countries.
Resolve Deep Seabed Mining Issues
The issue of deep seabed mining has plagued the world ever since it
was discovered what the nodules were composed of and the technology
existed to retrieve them. For over a decade this issue has persisted with-
out resolve. Some believe it may never be settled. With this in mind,
the United States enacted unilateral legislation to permit exploration
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and exploitation of the deep seabed while an international treaty is still
being negotiated. It was hoped this action would serve as an indication
that the sooner an international treaty could be negotiated and ratified,
the sooner the interim U.S. domestic legislation would be shelved.
The passage of the legislation may strengthen our negotiating position
at the conference. The U.S. has previously stated its intent to follow
through with domestic legislation, only to have it held up in Congress.
But in 1980, the Act passed Congress and was signed by the President as law
in mid-1980. The Group of 77 must now realize the United States will not
be forced into a treaty against it liking due to prolonged negotiations
and needless delays. The U.S. can ill-afford to sign an international
compact that does not furnish some sort of industrial and economic
guarantees and is in keeping with our national interests.
No Limit on Mineral Recovery
Another advantage of the unilateral approach is the absence of the
limitations On the amount of minerals to be recovered. Under the inter-
national formula a quota would exist on the quantity of minerals to be taken
and this quota system would prevail for the initial twenty-five years of the
mining operation. No such quota system is included within the U.S. domestic
legislation.
Protect U.S. Legal Position
With the passage of domestic legislation the U.S. may be strengthening
a future legal position. If, for some reason, the United States fails to
ratify a treaty and continues mining the deep seabed under domestic law,
a precedent may be set for future challanges. There is little doubt this
interpretation of "freedom of the sea" would go uncha Ll.anged , It woul d ,
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however, be to the benefit of the United States to be able to document its
mining legislation and show it has been commercially marketing these
minerals for some time.
These, then, are what I perceive to be the advantages of unilateral
legislation for the United States. Some are only minor factors when put on
an international scale, but together these considerations weigh heavy on
future supply and demand of critical minerals for this . country.
Disadvantages of Unilateral Legislation
We are now confronted with the disadvantages of the unilateral legis-
lation. It has been considered by many that enactment of domestic ocean
mining legislation would help resolve the UNCLOS III stalemate and enhance
our negotiating position at the conference. Yet, others who do no t support
the Act feel our bargaining position has become weakened and the law has
served to widen the already enormous gap between the developed and develop-
ing countries.
Another drawback of this domestic mining law is the ill-feelings it
will foster among the lesser developed nations of the world. It is the
contention of the Group of 77 that the U.S. has violated the Declaration of
Principles and the Moratorium Resolution, both principles they claim to be
international law. It is held that the United States, despite attempts to
make its domestic legislation resemble the proposed international treaty,
is exploitating the seabed for its own benefit. The revenue-sharing pro-
visions, the assertion of non-sovereignty over any area of the seabed, have
been met with skepticism and distrust.
The U.S. must also realize that the domestic legislation may assist
in bringing about a "no treaty" situation. If this happens, the Group of
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77, which now includes about 110 countries, may form their own mining
enterprise and file suit against the U.S. mining companies claiming the
nodules are part of the "common heritage of mankind". This test of the
"freedom of the seas" versus the "common heritage of mankind" may find the
U.S. government using its military to protect these ocean miners, or we
could see foreign nations deliberately disrupting the mining operations of
the U.S. companies to stress their claim that unilateralism is contrary to
their conception of international law.
The United States must also realize that the "package deal" of UNCLOS
III may be at stake. There is much to be gained through an international
treaty such as: 44
1. Finalizing of territorial seas at 12 miles;
2. Guarantees of free transit through and over
straits;
3. Firm definitions of the rights of all nations
within a 200 nautical mile economic zone;
4. Establishment of a system of dispute settlement
for conflicts involving ocean issues.
Some U.S. legislators, such as Senator Paul McCloskey, believe a new
comprehensive international law of the sea is far more valuable to the U.S.
than is the early use of U.S. technology to obtain new sources of nickel.
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cobalt, and copper. It has also been theorized that without a treaty the
mining consortia may be reluctant to proceed with seabed mining operations
knowing the potential investment and the possibility of future conflicting
claims to the minerals.
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Sununary
The developed nations of the world, in particular the United States.
and the developing countries have valid arguments either for the unilateral
approach to deep seabed mining or for the development of an international
regime. The information presented thus far gives indications that the
United States' actions surrounding unilateral legislation were in keeping
with presently accepted pr~nciples of international law. Although the U.S.
is on strong legal ground, we may find the political footing very tenuous.
The lesser developed countries' perception that the domestic mining act is
contrary to accepted norms may be as detrimental as if it really were
illegal. Many of these nations view the U.S. as the constant recipient of
the earth's wealth giving other nations little or no chance to share in the
benefits. So the major question might then be: Is unilateral legislation
worth the possible risks for the U.S. t and can we Overcome any of the
adverse political actions from abroad that are results of such actions?
Although not an expert in this area, and not in possession of the vast
amount of material accumulated during the Law of the Sea negotiations, I,
therefore, render a layman's opinion that the United States has taken the
most advantageous route to deep seabed mining with the passage of the Deep
Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act during the Carter presidency and the
"second look" the Reagan administration is affording the final UNCLOS III
negotiations. We have, as a nation, adopted legislation to create a 200
nautical mile exclusive fishing zone that is internationally recognized.
We have formulated a policy of challanging maritime claims that are not
consistent with presently accepted international law, thereby preserving
our Navy's mobility worldwide; and the passage of the domestic ocean mining
legislation has all but achieved our major goals at UNCLOS III through
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domestic, not international legislation.
What remains in the negotiating text are unnecessary and damaging
concessions, multiple ambiguities, and a blueprint for developing the
so-called "common heritage" principle which will result in stifling U.S.
technology for the production of vital resources from areas such as the
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oceans.
I feel the advantages of the unilateral course of action outweigh the
possible political repercussions that might be forthcoming. It has become
evident the mineral needs of the world are increasing while the world's
supply is dwindling. An alternate source, one that will meet anticipated
world requirements, can be found on the deep seabed in the form of mangan-
ese nodules. It would be ludicrous not to take advantage of this new
mineral suppLy ,
It seems that the initial reaction to U.S. domestic deep ocean mining
legislation was not as hostile as some had predicted. Many other developed
nations waited to see the reaction among the developing nations, and have
since passed or are in the process of drafting some sort of similar leg-
islation. It is not as though the U.S. had never participated in any
negotiations and single-handedly enacted domestic legislation. We have
effectively participated in all sessions without, however, reaching an
agreement suitable to our national security and economic interests. The
negotiations have gone On for more than seven years and compromises have
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been made on many fu~damenta1 issues. Accordingly, the time may be ripe
for the United States to gracefully decline further participation in the
f d " · . i d .. " 48process 0 ero 1ng 1ts mar1t me an resource acqu1s1t10n powers.
Paul B. Engo of Cameroon, chairman of the conunittee dealing with the
deep seabed issue, conceded "the text is not perfect to cover all the
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countries' interests; everyone had to give something and no one is entirely
happy.,,49 I do not believe in advocating ratification of a treaty just
for the sake of having some sort of international agreeluent that will b e
difficult at best to enforce and not really in the best interests of the
United States.
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